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What is plural in the law ? A
praxiological answer
Baudouin Dupret
1 Legal pluralism has become a major theme in socio-legal studies. However, under this
very broad term many different trends can be identiﬁed which share little but the very
basic idea that law is much more than state law. This article focuses on these theories
that address the plural nature of the law. It proceeds in ﬁve stages. In a ﬁrst section, it
describes  the  historical  scientiﬁc  background  of  the  theories,  namely,  the  pioneer
influence of Mauss and the works of Ehrlich, Malinowski, the Adat Law School, Pospisil
and Gurvitch. In a second section, it  addresses recent theories of legal pluralism and
summarizes the approaches of many scholars and scholarly trends to law; among which,
Griffiths’ radical theory, the French-speaking research, legal polycentricity, autopoiesis
and Chiba’s culturalist theory. The third section presents some of the major criticisms of
legal  pluralism.  These  critical  stances  vis-à-vis  the  legal  pluralistic  study  of  law  are
centered  around  three  main  questions:  the  deﬁnitional  problem,  the  functionalist
premises and the culturalist conception, all of which undermine existing theories. Among
possible remedies, realism and praxiology are proposed as answers in the fourth section,
in an attempt  to  mitigate  the consequences  of  these flaws.  In  the final  section,  this
praxiological  re-specification  is  illustrated  through  the  study  of  cases  related  to
customary marriage and homosexual relationships in Egypt. It is argued that these cases,
far from constituting overwhelming cases of legal pluralism, reveal the extent to which
the law is what people consider as law, and how often people’s actions orient to the
existence of law as an identiﬁable and speciﬁc referring point, according to which they
modify their behavior. 
 
The people’s law and state law: an old dispute
2 Reactions  to  dogmatic  conceptions  of  law are  as  old  as  social  science.  According  to
Durkheim, law is a social phenomenon that reflects “all the essential varieties of social
solidarity”; “social life, wherever it becomes lasting, inevitably tends to assume a definite
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form and become organized.  Law is  nothing more  than the  most  stable  and precise
element in this  very organization.” (Durkheim,  1983:33)  However,  Durkheim makes a
strong distinction between law and other normative phenomena. In La Division du travail
social, (1960) he makes the assessment that rules belonging to law and rules belonging to
morality – that is, rules with an organized sanction and those with a diffused one – must
be differentiated, even though both are linked to each other either through the legal rule
itself  (e.g.  the morality of  the rule sanctioning the crime),  or through the obligation
generated by the legal rule (the morality of the obligation to abide by the law). In a later
article (1924) he detaches morality from the idea of  sanction,  and moves toward the
concept of duty, conscientiousness and duty-bound desirability. 
3 In  establishing  such  a  distinction  between law and  morality,  the  work  of  Durkheim
allowed many theoreticians studying normativity in social life to break from the legal
perspective in order to analyse the social. However, it also led to the establishment of law
as a realm that was autonomous and impervious to the inﬂuence of other norms. As such,
he reproduced the classical  positivistic distinction drawn by Austin,  for whom law is
distinct from other normative orders because it is established on a command expressed
by a de facto legitimate authority with the power to sanction. Paradoxically, such a theory,
which aimed at making law independent from the hold of transcendence, was criticized
for its lack of social sensitivity. 
 
Malinowski and Ehrlich: law as social order
4 Building on Durkheim’s legacy, Marcel Mauss formulated the idea that, within a society,
there can be many legal systems interacting with each other, but he did not elaborate
further. More relevant for present purposes is Bronislaw Malinowski’s deﬁnition of law,
which he strongly associates with the notion of social control.  According to him, law
should be deﬁned “by function and not by form” (1934:xiii). There are many societies
lacking any centralized institution to enforce the  law,  but  there is  no society that  is
devoid of  rules that “are felt  and regarded as the obligations of  one person and the
rightful claims of another” (1926:55). As Brian Tamanaha puts it, Malinowski’s reasoning
is that: 
the  function  of  law  is  to  maintain  social  order;  social  order  can  be  found  in
regularized patterns of actual behavior; the binding mechanism maintaining these
patterns of behavior is the complex of social obligations (i.e. reciprocity); ipso facto,
legal  norms are the norms abstracted from actual  patterns of  behavior and the
mechanism of law resides in the social relations themselves. (Tamanaha, 1997:104) 
5 Accordingly, law is as plural as social life itself, and represents the rules that are “too
practical  to  be backed up by religious sanctions,  too burdensome to be left  to  mere
goodwill, too personally vital to individuals to be enforced by any abstract agency.” (Ibid.
:68) 
6 The contribution of  Eugene Ehrlich is  central  to the concept of  legal  pluralism.  This
Austrian sociologist developed the theory of “living law” in reaction to the ideology of an
exclusively  state-centered law.  Considering  that  law is  mostly  independent  from the
state, Ehrlich proposes what he calls a “scientiﬁc conception of law”, which is about the
rules of conduct. Accordingly, he states that “it is not an essential element of the concept
of law that it be created by the state, nor that it constitute the basis for the decisions of
the courts or other tribunals, nor that it be the basis of a legal compulsion consequent
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upon  such  a  decision.”  (1936:24)  Like  Malinowski,  Ehrlich  considers  that  law  is
fundamentally a question of social order, which is to be found everywhere, “ordering and
upholding every human association” (ibid.:25). It is from these associations, from these
instances that produce norms of social control, that law emerges. In other words, law is
synonymous with normativity. 
7 American legal realism was also concerned with the idea of plurality in the development
of legal systems, although it  does not use the word “pluralism”. Focusing on conflict
resolution more than on law as such, Llewellyn and Hoebel, (1941) for instance, stressed
the fact that normativity is dependent on the type of social unit in which people are
embedded in their relationships.  But legal  pluralism was indebted much more to the
Dutch Adat School, at least in its anthropological dimension1(adat is a word of Arabic
origin specifying local practices in Southeast Asia, as opposed to state law and Islamic
law).  As  early  as  1901,  Van  Vollenhoven2stated  that  the  associative  sub-groups that
societies are composed of produce their own law. He was followed by a whole set of Dutch
researchers, who succeeded in collecting and describing many legal practices in the field
of inheritance, marriage, land law, etc. After independence was achieved by the former
colonies, these researchers were followed by indigenous scholars who furthered the study
of local customs, although often idealizing their properties.3
 
The many levels of social law 
8 Georges Gurvitch’s theory deserves a particular mention. In two of his major books, L’idée
du droit social (1932) and L’expérience juridique et la philosophie du droit (1935), he developed
an unquestionably pluralistic approach to law. According to Gurvitch, there is historically
no fundamental unitary principle in law. State centralism is the achievement of speciﬁc
historical  and  political  conditions.  He  identifies  three  main  types  of  law,  which  are
hierarchized  differently  in  every  society:  state  law  (claiming  to  monopolize  legal
activities), inter-individual or inter-group law (bringing together exchanging individuals
or groups), and social law (bringing together individuals so as to constitute a collective
entity). The latter is clearly non-static, since it corresponds to the multiplicity of legal
systems that social law generates. Gurvitch also makes an important distinction between
the plurality of the sources of law and legal pluralism (Rouland, 1988). His theory did not
receive much attention. This may be attributed to different reasons, among which were
his vague, fanciful, complex and abstract language on the one hand, and on the other, the
fact that “his concept of  ‘social  law’  challenged and disturbed the traditional  juristic
notion of law which was founded on a state-centralistic ideology” (Banakar, 2000). 
9 Another  approach  that  should  be  mentioned  is  Leopold  Pospisil’s  concept  of  “legal
levels”, which is articulated around the idea that societies are never fully integrated. On
the contrary, societal structures are much more complex: 
Society, be it a tribe or a ‘modern’ nation, is not an undifferentiated amalgam of
people. It is rather a patterned mosaic of subgroups that belong to certain, usually
well-deﬁned  (or  deﬁnable)  types  with  different  memberships,  composition,  and
degree of inclusiveness. Every such subgroup owes its existence in a large degree to
a  legal  system that  is  its  own and that  regulates  the  behavior  of  its  members.
(Pospisil, 1971) 
10 Hence, there are as many legal systems as there are social subgroups. These systems are
organized segmentarily in inclusive levels, each level being made up of the sum of the
legal systems of subgroups of the same type and sharing the same degree of inclusiveness.
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11 These  many theories,  which  shared  in  common a  conception  of  the  non-centralized
pluralistic  nature of  law,  constituted a patchwork of  very different  trends that  were
independent from one another. On the contrary, the 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the
blossoming of a more fully integrated attempt to deal with law from a social perspective
that denied the state its monopoly on, and even its mastery of, the production of law. 
 
The new legal pluralism 
12 The expression “new legal pluralism”, borrowed from Sally Engle Merry, (1988:869-901)
aims at  describing the emergence of  the  notion of  legal  pluralism in scholarship by
studying societies without a colonial past. “To recognize legal pluralism at home required
rejecting what Griffiths calls the ‘ideology of legal centralism,’ the notion that the state
and the system of lawyers, courts, and prisons is the only form of ordering.” (id.:874) 
 
Griffiths’ radical perspective 
13 In  its  radicalism,  John  Griffiths’  article  “What  Is  Legal  Pluralism”4might  prove
instrumental for describing the basic tenets of this new trend. Moreover, it remains a
seminal  contribution  in  the  ﬁeld.5Griffiths  ﬁrst  identiﬁes  his  main  enemy:  legal
centralism, the law of which 
is  an  exclusive,  systematic  and  unified  hierarchical  ordering  of  normative
propositions, which can be looked at either from the top downwards as depending
from a sovereign command (Bodin, 1576; Hobbes, 1651; Austin, 1832) or from the
bottom upwards as deriving their validity from ever more general layers of norms
until one reaches some ultimate norm(s) (Kelsen, 1949; Hart, 1961).6
14 Claiming that  legal  centralism is  an ideology,  he charges many social  scientists  with
having confused a normative stance and a descriptive one. According to him, law does not
exist where the proponents of legal centralism asserted that it would: if it did exist, legal
centralism would be “a myth,  an ideal,  a  claim,  an illusion”,7whereas legal  pluralism
would be the fact. Griffiths then proceeds to the distinction between what he calls strong
and weak deﬁnitions of legal pluralism. The former refers to legal systems in which the
sovereign  commands  or  validates  or  recognizes  different  bodies  of  law for  different
groups in the population; a weak conception of legal pluralism, however,  is mainly a
(weak) conception of legal centralism, for it gives the central state the ultimate power to
acknowledge or deny the existence of such different bodies of law. The strong deﬁnition
of legal pluralism, on the other hand, is the one that, according to Griffiths, is directly
concerned with “an empirical state of affairs in society,”8and not with mere ideology. 
15 It  is  by the yardstick of such a distinction between weak and strong deﬁnitions that
Griffiths evaluates existing descriptive conceptions of legal pluralism. This explains his
comments both on Gilissen’s introduction and Jacques Vanderlinden’s contribution to Le
pluralisme juridique (1972), which he criticizes for having remained at the level of “the
typification, explanation and justiﬁcation of non-uniformity within state legal systems.”9
On the contrary, anthropologists would have no difficulty in recognizing legal pluralism
in its strong empirical sense. Here Griffiths reviews the works of Ehrlich and Pospisil (see
above), and then adds to the discussion the writings of M. G. Smith and 
16 S. F. Moore. Before turning to the latter, it should be said that Griffiths concludes by
giving his deﬁnition of law and legal pluralism. Law, he says, is the self-regulation of
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every social ﬁeld – it becomes synonymous with social control; but in regard to legal
pluralism, law becomes the legal organization of society, which is “congruent with its
social organization.”10
17 Sally  Falk Moore has  been unanimously applauded among legal  pluralists  for  having
provided the appropriate locus of law in socio-legal research. She claims that “the social
structure”  is  composed  of  many  “semi-autonomous  social  ﬁelds”,  the  deﬁnition  and
boundaries  of  which  are  not  given  by  their  organization,  but  “by  a  processual
characteristic,  the fact that it can generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to
them” (1978:57). Three characteristics of Moore’s concept explain the appeal it exercised:
ﬁrst, she presents these ﬁelds as the fundamental unit of social control, which is directly
connected to behavioral norms of conduct; second, every individual may simultaneously
belong to many social ﬁelds, which accounts for social complexity;11third, a social ﬁeld is
autonomous,  i.e.  it  can  resist  the  penetration  of  external  norms,  but  never  totally,
because its capacity for resistance is  a function of  the degree of  independence of  its
members vis-à-vis itself and of its ability to resist norms originating in other ﬁelds. It
should be noted, however, that Moore does not use the word “law” when describing the
rules and norms that are generated by semi-autonomous social ﬁelds. 
 
French-speaking scholarship 
18 Jacques Vanderlinden, who was one of the many victims of Griffiths’ critique, contributed
a  reappraisal  of  his  own  concept  of  legal  pluralism  20  years  later.  (1989:149-157)
Vanderlinden’s  position  is  interesting  in  that  it  identiﬁes  some  of  the  reasons  that
propelled lawyers into adhering to a certain concept of legal pluralism. First, he reacts
against a continental, civil (as in civil law) way of considering law. In contrast to legal
theory, which has a very restrictive understanding of the concept of rule, Vanderlinden
advocates taking into consideration normative practices. Second, he considers law as just
one regulating system among others (politeness, morals, fashion, good manners, etc.),
which  is,  however,  distinctive  because  of  its  hegemonic  ambition.  This  means  that,
contrary to Griffiths, Vanderlinden does not deny the speciﬁcity of state law and does not
reduce it to mere social control. Third, he states that society as such is plural, meaning
that pluralistic normative orderings cannot be evaluated by the yardstick of a monistic
societal  conception.  Finally,  Vanderlinden advocates approaching the phenomenon of
legal pluralism from the perspective of the normative practices of individuals embedded
within  social  networks,  and  individually  shopping  in  these  many  normative  fora.
Paradoxically, Vanderlinden, who at the beginning of his argument recognizes a certain
speciﬁcity of law, ends with the statement that individuals, because of their belonging to
many social networks, are subjected to many legal systems. (1993:575-583) 
19 In sum, scholars like Vanderlinden made the assumption that, because of the existing gap
between legal practices and formal textual legal provisions, there is a plurality of laws. As
Evelyne  Serverin  puts  it,  “instead  of  seeing  in  these  practices  the  sad  effect  of  the
inefficiency  of  law,  it  should  be  read  [following  these  authors]  as  the  positive
manifestation of their conformity to other legal orderings.”12According to some of these
scholars, these alternative legal orderings are totally independent of state law, whereas
according to others the state remains the gravity point of these practices. However, all
converge in challenging the legitimacy of state law. In France, people like André-Jean
Arnaud focus their research on the emergence of “multiple spontaneous legal orderings”
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(1998:81) on the basis of the distinction between law as it is imposed and law as it is lived.
In Québec, Jean-Guy Belley made an attempt to bridge the gap between French-inspired
and Anglo-Saxon approaches to legal pluralism. In his last research, he speaks of the
“conjunction of normativities” rather than of concurrence (1998). In Switzerland, Jean-
François Perrin stresses the efficacy of “parallel or concurring legalities … even when
they conﬂict with the system of state norms.” (1997:36) 
20 Today, the classical theme of conﬂict resolution seems to constitute the focus of this
French-speaking  pluralist  program.  “Lawyers,  whether  they  call  themselves  legal
sociologists or anthropologists, converge in the same perspective of the recognition of a
non-institutional justice administered by non professional third parties.” Serverin, op.cit.
:68) As mentioned above, this interest in the anthropology of conﬂict may be traced back
to American legal realism and Llewellyn’s “trouble case method”, and more recently to
Laura Nader and Harry Todd’s  Disputing Process  (1978)  and Simon Roberts’s  Order  and
Dispute (1979).13
 
Legal polycentricity 
21 With the emergence of the “concept” of postmodernity, scholars oriented their research
in legal pluralism toward a new deﬁnition. According to Armando Guevara-Gil and Joseph
Thome, Boaventura de Sousa Santos “has been able to forge a postmodern conception of
law deﬁned in terms of legal pluralism and of interlegality, that is, encompassing both the
social constructions of normative orders and the human experiencing of them.” (1992:87)
14Santos states: 
legal  pluralism  is  the  key  concept  in  a  postmodern  view of  law.  Not  the  legal
pluralism of traditional legal anthropology in which the different legal orders are
conceived as separate entities coexisting in the same political space, but rather the
conception of different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in
our minds as much as in our legal actions (1989:279-302, at 297-298). 
22 Between these multiple networks of legal orders, there is continuous porosity. A person’s
life “is constituted by an intersection of different legal orders, that is, by interlegality”
(Santos, op.cit.:298). 
23 In order to make sense of these legally plural contexts, people need a “new common legal
sense”, which would aim “at trivializing our daily encounters with the laws so that their
meaning  becomes  clear  to  the  untrained  law  user”  (Santos,  op.cit.:302).  Drawing  a
metaphorical  comparison  with  geographical  cartography,  Santos  describes  how  this
“polycentric legal world” represents and transforms reality through a set of conventions.
It would provide, according to Ghevara-Gil and Thome, “the methodological clues and
theoretical propositions regarding how different legalities are constructed, enforced and
experienced, within and beyond the intra-state level of conﬂicting legalities” (Guevara-
Gil, Thome, op.cit.:91). Santos acknowledges that, under his deﬁnition, there is a great
variety of legal orders. However, he focuses on what he calls “six structural clusters of
social relations in capitalist societies integrating the world system:” domestic law (norms
and dispute settlements resulting from social relations in the household), production law
(resulting  from  labor  relations),  exchange  law  (resulting  from  merchant  relations),
community law (resulting from group identities), state law and systemic law (“the legal
form of the worldplace”), and these very broadly deﬁned legal clusters potentially and
partly overlap each other (Santos, 1995:429). 
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24 The  concept  of  polycentricity  of  law  was  also  developed  by  scholars  in  the  Nordic
European countries.  It  refers  to  a  category  of  instances  of  legal  pluralism,  which  is
described as the use of sources of law in different sectors of the state administration. As
summarized by Gordon Woodman (1998): “the principal hypothesis, which is currently
the subject of research, is that different authorities frequently use different sources of
law, and that even when they use the same sources they observe different orders of
priority between them.” According to Agnete Bentzon (1992), the aim is to supplement
“Sally Falk Moore’s picture of the semi-autonomous social ﬁelds inside the apparatus of
the State.” 
 
Autopoiesis and legal pluralism 
25 The  theory  of  autopoiesis  rests  on  three  main  assumptions:  law,  as  an  autonomous
epistemological  subject,  constructs  its  own  social  reality;  law,  as  a  communicational
process, produces human actors as semantic artifacts; and because of the simultaneity of
its  dependence  and  independence  vis-à-vis  other  social  discourses,  modern  law
permanently  balances  between  positions  of  cognitive  autonomy  and  heteronomy
(Teubner,  1992a:1150).  On such a basis,  Gunther Teubner,  the theory’s  leading figure
together with Niklas Luhmann, constructs his own theory of legal pluralism. 
26 First,  Teubner criticizes the “classical approach” to legal pluralism for its inability to
properly deﬁne law. This is due to two main ﬂaws in classical legal pluralism: ﬁrst, legal
pluralists  make no proper  distinction between law and other  kinds  of  normativities;
second, they attribute to law a single function, whereas various functions are identiﬁable.
Then, he deﬁnes legal pluralism “no longer as a set of conﬂicting social norms in a given
social ﬁeld but as a multiplicity of diverse communicative processes that observe social
action under the binary code of legal/illegal” (Teubner, 1992b). 
27 This binary code of legal/illegal is constituted as the discriminating factor, which allows
the exclusion of “purely economic calculations” as well as of “sheer pressures of power
and  merely  conventional  or  moral  norms,  transactional  patterns  or  organizational
routines” (ibid.). This binary code is not peculiar to state law, but “it creates instead the
imagery  of  a  heterarchy  of  diverse  legal  discourses”  (ibid.).  Finally,  it serves  many
functions,  among  which  are  “social  control,  conﬂict  regulation,  reaffirmation  of
expectations, social regulation, coordination of behavior or the disciplining of bodies and
souls”  (ibid.:15).  Law  in  its  autopoietic  version  is  thus,  as  Brian  Tamanaha  stresses,
“essential to the survival and functioning of the overall social system that provides its
environment” (Tamanaha, op.cit.:308).  It  should be added that,  following Teubner,  the
legal system is everything that is coded along this binary legal/illegal line and is not
conﬁned to formal legal institutions. 
 
Legal pluralism as an anti-hegemonic counter-claim 
28 Massaji Chiba’s theory of non-official laws remains apart from the different orientations
described above. The main endeavor of this Japanese scholar is, Gordon Woodman says,
“less to develop or clarify a deﬁnition of legal pluralism than to develop or clarify the
features  of  certain instances  of  legal  pluralism.”  (Woodman,  op.cit)  Instead of  simply
opposing state law and people’s law, Chiba identiﬁes many legal levels: official law, i.e.
“the  legal  system  authorized  by  the  legitimate  authority  of  a  country”  (1987:173);
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unofficial  law,  i.e.  “the legal  system which is  not officially authorized by the official
authorities,  but authorized in practice by the general consensus of a certain circle of
people” (ibid.) – and which has a distinctive inﬂuence on the effectiveness of the official
law; and legal postulates, i.e. “the system of values and ideals specifically relevant to both
official and unofficial law in founding and orienting the latter” (ibid.). These three levels
are not organized according to a rigid and permanent hierarchy, but differ from one
society  to  another.  For  instance,  Eastern  societies  would  be  characterized  by  their
reliance on unofficial law, whereas Western ones would be mainly state-centered. Besides
these legal levels, Chiba identiﬁes three dichotomies of law: official law vs. unofficial law,
legal rules vs. legal postulates, and indigenous law vs. transplanted law (ibid.:177-179). It
is  in  the  combination  of  these  many  levels  and  dichotomies  that  the  law  of  each
individual country could be analyzed. This analytical scheme serves “to advance social
sciences of non-Western law with respect to the alleged cultural lag or legal pluralism”
(Chiba, 1993:13). 
 
Critiques 
29 According to Merry, Moore’s concept of semi-autonomous social fields remains “the most
enduring, generalizable, and widely-used conception of plural legal order” (Merry, op.cit.
:878). Such a statement reveals how little criticism has been addressed to the concept and
the  propositions  associated  with  it  (Woodman,  op.cit.).  It  also  reflects  the  increasing
support that the radical theory of legal pluralism received. Nowadays, legal anthropology,
the sociology of law and legal theory, must pay tribute to it. However, the two sections
above have shown that, “since there are many competing versions of what is meant by
‘law’,  the  assertion  that  law  exists  in  plurality  leaves  us  with  a  plurality  of  legal
pluralisms” (Tamanaha, 2000:297). Accordingly, the critiques that may be addressed are
many, and potentially different from one version to another. In the following section,
these critiques are organized around what appear to be the three main fundamental ﬂaws
undermining existing legal pluralistic theories: its definitional problem, its functionalist
nature and its holistic essentialist culturalism. 
 
Definitional deadlock 
30 Griffiths explicitly identiﬁes the ideology of legal centralism as what legal pluralism set
out to challenge. While the state portrays itself as the sole lawmaker, legal pluralism
highlights the multitude of partially autonomous and self-regulating social  ﬁelds also
producing legal rules. However, there is a strong case for moving away from the present
dichotomization of the analysis of the phenomenon of law between state law and legal
pluralism. 
31 Brian Tamanaha reveals some of the many weaknesses in the reasoning of the proponents
of legal pluralism, among which is the “conclusion that all forms of social control are
law” (Tamanaha, 1993:193). Merry comments that “calling all forms of ordering that are
not state law by the name law confounds the analysis” (op.cit.:878). The problem can be
attributed  to  the  confusion  between  descriptive  and  non-descriptive  concepts.  Law
belongs to the latter, at least in the sense that it never constituted a tool in the hands of
sociologists for describing social reality. When they establish law as synonymous with
social  norm,  legal  pluralists  create  an  ambiguity,  since  they  use  a  word  that  has  a
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commonsense meaning to perform an analytical task that runs contrary to this meaning.
In other words, what is the analytical utility of using the word “law” to describe what
common sense would never associate with law (good manners, etc.),  especially if  this
alleged concept either does not convey anything that makes it distinct from other less
connoted words (like norm), or surreptitiously conveys the distinctive character of what
it is supposed to be contrary to? 
32 Tamanaha goes  further  and states  that  “lived norms are qualitatively  different  from
norms  recognized  and  applied  by  legal  institutions  because  the  latter  involves
‘positivizing’  the  norms,  that  is,  the  norms  become  ‘legal’  norms  when  they  are
recognized as such by legal actors” (id.:208). Contrary to what I claimed in another article
(1999), this critique is very sound, although the dividing line is less between lived norms
and positivized norms,  than between law as  recognized and referred to  by people  –
whoever they are – and other moralities and normativities as recognized and referred to
by people, whoever they are.15
33 In other words, law is not an analytical concept, but only what people claim that it is, a
position that allows denial of the relevance of a question that a hundred years of legal
sociology and anthropology have been unable to settle: the question of the boundaries of
juridicity. The existence of law is evidenced only by its self-affirmation, or, rather, by its
identiﬁcation as  such by people.  This  does  not  preclude the study of  normativity  in
general – on the contrary – but it seriously challenges the possibility of conducting it
under  the  auspices  of  a  non-descriptive  (“legal”)  ideology  (“pluralism”).16It  is  non-
descriptive,  in the  sense  that  it  has  used  the  legal  vocabulary  to  describe  general
normativity and has used general normativity to completely dilute law (as it is referred to
by people in general). It is ideological, in the sense that legal pluralism, although it leans
towards the recognition of all diffused normativities, ignores the fact that there is no
possibility of recognizing any normativity as law without an authority having the right to
say what is right and the capacity to interpret it as law, meaning that arguing against
state law would necessarily mean arguing in favor of any such other authority. 
 
Functionalism 
34 This deﬁnitional problem of legal pluralism is related to the fundamental assumption that
lies behind its construction. Law is considered to be the concept that expresses the social
function of ordering which is performed by social institutions. According to Tamanaha
(1997, op. cit.:106), the main representatives of the functionalist theory in the study of law
are Malinowski, Parsons and Luhman. Basically, these authors share the idea that: (1) law
has a role and a nature; (2) this role and nature are determined a priori by their social
function; (3) this function is to maintain order in society. Even in its most sophisticated
versions,  legal  pluralists  assume  this  legal  function:  “The  normative  orders  of  legal
pluralism  always  produce  normative  expectations  […] And  they  may  serve  many
functions.” (Teubner, 1992, op.cit.:15) 
35 As  shown  by  Searle,  among  others,  functionalism  is  necessarily  associated  with
intentionality: the heart does not have the function to pump blood, except if there was an
intentional  agent  that  created it  to  pump blood;  on the other hand,  artiﬁcial  hearts
indeed have the function to pump blood. 
Whenever the function of X is to Y, X and Y are parts of a system where the system
is  in  part  deﬁned  by  purposes,  goals,  and  values  generally.  This  is  why  there  are
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functions of policemen and professors but no function of human as such – unless
we think of human as part of some larger system where their function is, e.g., to
serve God. (Searle, 1995:19) 
36 Accordingly, whereas law, when conceived as an institution created to regulate human
relations, might be given a social function, law, when it is understood as emanating from
the  social,  might  hardly  be  given  such  a  function.  Otherwise,  it  would  mean  as  a
consequence that societies would be credited from scratch (from before their existence as
societies) with a collective consciousness, which in turn would result in their creating the
institutions necessary to their functioning, i.e. they would have created themselves. In
other words, functional analysis can only operate if law is considered as the product of an
intentional agency. 
37 Yet, some legal pluralists consider law as the product of an intentional agency. This is the
case with Teubner,  for whom the multiple orders of  legal  pluralism exclude “merely
social conventions and moral norms”, recharacterized by their common organizing “on
the binary code legal/illegal,” and “may serve many functions: social control, conflict
regulation, reaffirmation of expectations, social regulation, coordination of behavior or
the disciplining of bodies and souls” (Teubner, 1992b, op.cit.:15). However, this “legalistic”
version of  legal  pluralism is  only a  partial  solution to the problem of  functionalism.
Indeed, in considering that law is multifunctional or even dysfunctional, this explanation
still assumes that legal institutions have been created so as to systematically perform one
function or another. This leaves no room for their being non-functional. Moreover, these
systems  are,  according  to  Teubner,  autopoietic,  i.e.  they  are  radically  autonomous
subsystems which communicationally produce and reproduce their components within
the system (which is operationally closed).17
38 The question that remains is: Has law been intentionally created so as to independently
perform social functions? This is historically and empirically dubious. Obviously, parts of
law were crafted so as to perform functions (though they never succeeded in being totally
efficient in performing them). Also, it is clear that other parts of law were not conceived
in such a way. If there are many legal constructors, there was never any Creator of the
Concept of Law, although such an intention remains necessary for the sake of functional
analysis. 
 
Essentialist culturalism 
39 Legal pluralism has also often proved very essentialist and culturalist. Generally with the
best  intentions,  some legal  pluralists  promoted concepts  like “folk law,”  “indigenous
law,”  “native  law,”  “imported  law,”  “transplanted  law,”  “state  law,”  “official  law,”
“unofficial law,” “primitive law,” etc. Besides the huge definitional problems associated
with the term “law,” it mainly assumes that there is something like a “true” law, which is
the reﬂection of an “authentic” society whose main cultural characters are translated
into rules of conduct. Actually, this kind of “nativist” interpretation is not worth any
close examination. It offers a very naïve picture of law, which is far from being supported
by substantial empirical evidence. The so-called “indigenous” or “native” law has often
never existed except in the heads of these scholars,  although it  is  constituted as the
yardstick to which the scope of legal “acculturation” is evaluated. 
40 Much more interesting is Clifford Geertz’s interpretive theory. This is not the proper
place to discuss  it,  and suffice to say that  he conceives of  law as  a  cultural  code of
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meanings  for  interpreting  the  world:  “‘Law’  here,  there,  or  anywhere,  is  part  of  a
distinctive manner of imagining the real.” (Geertz, 1983:184) In this hermeneutic project,
“words are keys to understanding the social institutions and cultural formulations that
surround them and give them meaning” (Merry, op.cit.:886). Geertz gives the example of
the Arabic word “haqq”, which is supposed to come from a speciﬁc moral world and to
connect to a distinctive legal sensibility (Geertz, op.cit.:185). This word would carry along
with it all the speciﬁc meanings that are co-substantial with something called “Islamic
law.” In plural situations, i.e., situations where many cultural systems are described as
interacting (for  instance  in  Egypt,  where  modern law is  commonly  presented as  co-
existing with Islamic law and customary law), law would produce a “polyglot discourse”
(Geertz,  op.cit.:226).  In that sense,  pluralism would only be the juxtaposition of  many
cultural and legal histories. 
41 However, culturalism fundamentally conceives of law in holistic terms, that is, as one of
the many reverberations of a larger explaining principle: culture.18Yet, this cultural unity
is not deduced from empirical observation, but assumed from the beginning. This is how
Rosen proceeds when, starting from the small  Moroccan town of Sefrou,  he ends his
journey with the anthropology of justice in Islam (Rosen, 1989). Moreover, he considers
that Middle Eastern culture, which Moroccan culture is supposed to epitomize, can itself
be caught by one “key metaphor”, one “central analogy”: “It is an image of the bazaar
market-place writ large in social relations, of negotiated agreements extending from the
realm of the public forum into those domains – of family, history, and cosmology – where
they might not most immediately be expected to reside.” (id.:11) 
42 This kind of approach carries a strong flavor of genetic essentialism, according to which
societies – and the laws that characterize them – carry with them throughout history the
same basic tenets, which are only superﬁcially scratched by historical incidents. Also, it
seems that cultural interpretivists are much more interested in the “why” question than
in the “how”, although attention given to the latter would have enabled them to consider
that law is not necessarily and integrally part of culture, and that culture is not a set of
permanent  pre-existing  assumptions,  but  something  that  is  permanently  produced,
reproduced, negotiated and oriented to by members of various social settings. 
 
Respecifications 
43 This fourth section reviews some of the possible remedies that might help to re-specify
the question of the plural nature of law. A few years ago, I supported the idea of giving up
the use of the words “law” and “legal” for analytical purposes. In response to the question
of the sociological  boundaries of juridicity,  I  answered that the question is devoid of
sociological  relevance  (Dupret,  op.cit.:30).  From  a  distance,  I  would  say  that  social
scientists have no means of sociologically defining law outside what people say law is,
with the consequence that any study of law should basically look at what people do and
say when practicing what they call law. 
 
Realism 
44 From an epistemological standpoint, the problem of definition is fundamental. The real
danger of speaking of “law” when dealing with all forms of norms is, ﬁrst, to equate them
with something that people consider as totally different. Second, it is to take a product of
What is plural in the law ? A praxiological answer
Égypte/Monde arabe, 1 | 2005
11
political theory (state law) for a sociological tool (legal pluralism). Third, it is to assume a
functional deﬁnition of some general social mechanisms (social control), whereas non-
intentional phenomena cannot be given any social function. Instead of elevating law to
the rank of an analytical instrument, I would suggest going back to the observation of
social practices and considering, in the broad ﬁeld of the many normativities, that law is
what people refer to as law. 
45 This is  what is  advocated by Tamanaha,  according to whom “the project  to devise a
scientiﬁc  concept  of  law was  based upon the  misguided belief  that  law comprises  a
fundamental  category.  […]  Law is  whatever  we  attach  the  label  law  to.  It  is  a  term
conventionally applied to a variety of multifaceted, multifunctional phenomena” (1997,
op.cit.:128). In other words, “what law is, is determined by the people in the social arena
through their own common usages, not in advance by the social scientist or theorist” (
ibid.:314). Accordingly, a situation of legal pluralism would exist “whenever more than
one kind of ‘law’ is recognized through the social practices of a group in a given social
arena” (ibid.:315). Tamanaha argues that, whereas legal pluralism states that the word law
applies  to  the  many  manifestations  of  a  single  basic  phenomenon,  his  approach,
conversely, would assume that the same label ‘law’ applies to many different phenomena.
46 Tamanaha claims that his approach conveys many advantages. First, it overcomes the
inability to distinguish legal norms from social norms. Second, it provides practicable
criteria for distinguishing between a legal rule-system and normative pluralisms. Third, it
urges that  all  these forms of  law-recognized-as-such in one speciﬁc social  arena “be
studied in their speciﬁc manifestation, and in their relations with other kinds of law in
that  social  arena,  and  as  they  compare  to  general  categories  of  kinds  of  law  or
manifestations of law in other social arenas” (ibid.:318). Fourth, this approach does not,
through its elaboration, lose the force of the legal pluralistic appeal, i.e. that there are
forms of law which are not connected to the state, or only loosely . By so doing, this
approach would be successful, according to Tamanaha, precisely where legal pluralism
has failed, that is, in providing a descriptive non-ideological theory of the plural nature of
law. “Indeed, one merit of this approach – what makes it non-essentialist – is that it is
entirely  free  of  presuppositions  about  law  (beyond  the  negative  one  that  it  has  no
essence). Everything is left open to empirical investigation, and category construction
and analysis following such investigation. Another signiﬁcant merit [… is that] it directs
an equally sharp-eyed, unsentimental view at all manifestations and kinds of law” (ibid.
:318-319). In sum, conducting research into legal pluralism is to look at situations where
there is a plurality of kinds of law, law being understood as what people conventionally
refer to as law. 
 
Praxiology 
47 Under this heading, it will be argued that, even though Tamanaha’s approach greatly
enhances the sociological study of law, it  still  suffers from some ﬂaws, which can be
mitigated  by  the  deepening  of  his  insights  and  by  the  adoption  of  a  praxiological
approach to legal phenomena. 
48 The main problem of Tamanaha’s conception of law comes from his attempt to root it in
the combination of behaviorism and interpretivism, which is deemed to have overcome
some of the classical caveats of legal sociology and anthropology and to be reﬂected in his
realistic  socio-legal  theory.  However,  as  mentioned  above,  one  of  the  difficulties  of
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interpretivism is related to its culturalist essentialist standpoint. This is not to say that
such a perspective has no scientific value, but it points to the fact that it reproduces some
of the deﬁciencies it is supposed to eliminate. Among other things, it maintains one of the
dualities that muddies contemporary sociological theorizing, that is, the duality opposing
activities and meanings. Instead of considering that this opposition constitutes the main
problem to be solved in order to succeed in theorizing, I suggest that it is the propensity
to theorizing itself  that  should be questioned.  In other  words,  the inquiry “into the
comprehensibility  of  society,  into  the  ways  in  which social  life  can be  understood and
described when seen from within by members” should be substituted for the theoretical
elaboration of “a speciﬁc mode of comprehending society, a theoretical framework within 
which a substantive conception of society is to be construed” (Sharrock et al., 1988:59). It
is deﬁnitely not Geertz’s interpretivist culturalism – not to mention Rosen’s – that will
promote such an inquiry, for he assumes the constraint of a preexisting cultural order to
which people conform, and that the task of the social scientist is to discover the keyword
that epitomizes it, and not to look at practices from which to infer people’s orientation to
the many constraints of the local settings in which they (inter)act. 
49 On the contrary, a praxiological approach requires using “the criteria that participants
have for determining the salient features of interactional episodes,” (Maynard, 1984:19)
and this does not provide an interpretation of people’s conduct. “Rather, analysis is based
on,  and  made  valid  by,  the  participants’  own  orientations,  characterizations,  and
exhibited understandings” (ibid.). In other words, while the opposition between meaning
and behavior “requires its solution by means […] which are external to the orderliness
observable in the sites of everyday activity,” e.g. social structures, local cultures, schemes
of  behavior,  etc.,  the  praxiological  respecification  that  I  advocate,  following
ethnomethodologists like Wes Sharrock and Graham Button, considers “the problem of
social order’ as completely internal to those sites” (1991:141). It also means that it is not so
much the “why” questions – which form the basis of interpretivism – which should draw
the attention of legal sociology, but the “what” and “how” questions – “what is involved
in doing this or that?”; “how does X manage to do Y?”. 
50 Another  major  problem  arises  from  the  slippery  nature  of  definitional  endeavors.
Although Tamanaha succeeds in escaping legal pluralism’s deﬁnitional caveat, mainly by
characterizing law as what people refer to as law, it does not make him immune from
falling into the pit  of  other  deﬁnitional  enigmas.  For  instance,  when advocating the
restriction of the use of the word “legal” to state law (Tamanaha, 1993, op.cit.:212) or
when ascribing to certain legal systems a particular character (e.g. theocracy in Iran–
Tamanaha, 2000, op.cit.:318), he substitutes the wider perspective of his scholarly vision
to  people’s  production  of  and  orientation  to  an  identiﬁable,  understandable,  and
practicable  law,  which  does  not  necessarily  attend  to  these  statist  or  theocratic
characterizations.  There  are  other  places  where  one  can  ﬁnd  this  ambivalence,  for
example, when it is stated, on the one hand, that law is what people refer to as law, and
when it is assumed, on the other hand, that people use the label law to refer to what are
often quite different phenomena.
51 In  other  words,  whereas  Tamanaha  rightly  criticizes  legal  pluralism  for  its  over-
inclusiveness, i.e. its inclusion of phenomena that most people would not consider to be
law,  and  its  under-inclusiveness,  i.e.  its  exclusion  of  phenomena  that  many  would
consider to be law (ibid.:315), he queers the pitch by underestimating people’s practical
and context-sensitive understanding of the word “law” or its equivalents. In fact, people
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do not loosely use the same word to refer to different phenomena; they speciﬁcally use
one word to refer to some speciﬁc phenomenon, the production and intelligibility of
which they orient toward in the local and temporal context in which they interact. The
same word might be used to refer to another phenomenon in another context or in
another sequence, but this is a question that must be empirically answered through the
close examination of each interactional occurrence taking place in every speciﬁc setting.
This runs against the interpretivist notion of the legal polyglot discourse. In that sense,
the notion of  legal  pluralism does not  exist  as  a  sociological  question unless  people,
participants,  or  members  orient  to  it  as  such.  In  other  words,  the  question of  legal
pluralism does not arise from scholars looking at the social world from outside, but it
becomes a topic in its own right when it emerges out of people’s practices that they
orient to a situation of co-existing, conﬂating and/or conﬂicting multiple laws. 
52 Finally,  with regard to the questions that  the realistic  approach to legal  phenomena
might raise,  my contention is that they are better solved by adopting a praxiological
perspective. The first question concerns the identity of the people whose practices qualify
a phenomenon as law. While the realistic theory answers that it is any social group, the
praxiological approach would rather say that there is no such question unless or until
people call  into question the authority of  someone or  something having identiﬁed a
phenomenon  as  law.  The  question  only  emerges  from  practical,  local,  speciﬁc
circumstances. Up to that point, it is a question of a philosophical and political nature,
not a practical and sociological one. 
53 To the question of how many people are necessary to view a phenomenon as law for this
phenomenon to qualify as such, it is answered that “a minimum threshold to qualify is if
sufficient  people  with  sufficient  conviction  consider  something  to  be  ‘law’,  and  act
pursuant to this belief, in ways that have an inﬂuence in the social arena” (ibid.:319). This
answer suffers from its giving to whatever external authority the task to subsequently
determine  how  people,  conviction  and  inﬂuence  should  be  rated  in  order  to  be
considered as sufficient, whereas it would be said in a praxiological perspective that no
answer can be given a priori, since it is from people’s practices that the qualification of
something as law will be recognized as such (and thus will remain unnoticed), or will not
be recognized as such (and thus will be noticed and become accountable). 
54 It is also said that a third question would address the risk of a proliferation of kinds of law
in the social  arena.  Tamanaha’s  answer is  that such a profusion of  kinds of  law will
seldom occur in practice. To the same question, the praxiological answer would be that it
is not up to social scientists to decide by means of concepts whether there are too many
or too few kinds of law, but it is an empirical phenomenon which must be attended to
through a close scrutiny of people’s practices. Moreover, since activities in legal settings
are characterized, as are human activities in general, by the general orientation to the
production of  intelligibility,  coordination and order,  it  would be rather surprising to
observe such an anarchical proliferation of laws without observable attempts to reduce it.
This last question addresses the authority which is granted by conventionalism to social
actors to initiate new kinds of law. The realistic answer stresses that law as a social
institution is necessarily produced by social actors, and that recognizing these actors’
authority only threatens the authority of social and legal theorists. This holds true in a
praxiological perspective. Moreover, it should be said that it is not up to legal sociologists
and anthropologists to determine whether or not to grant social actors the authority to
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initiate new laws. All  that social sciences can do is to observe and describe how real
people in real settings orient to the production of a phenomenon which they call law. 
 
Plurality of sources, plurality of laws, plurality of
practices: Egyptian cases by way of illustration 
55 This last section aims to illustrate the many ways in which the notion of legal plurality is
given a practical meaning and is practically oriented to by various people engaged in the
performance of some legal activity. All three cases presented below concern the issue of
customary marriage in the Egyptian context.  It  must be noted that the very succinct
treatment of these cases forbids considering them as the proper way to conduct any
praxiological  research.  Instead,  their  contribution  is  to  the  strengthening  of  my
contention  that  the  theory  of  legal  pluralism  has  little  heuristic  capacity  in  the
explanation of the law, the pluralistic character of which must not be determined by
some external criterion, but only when it belongs explicitly to the relevancies of situated
practices. 
 
Customary marriage according to Egyptian law 
56 In  Egypt,  a  series  of  laws  (1920,  1929,  1943,  1946,  1947,  1952,  1976,  1985,  and 2000)
organize personal status, i.e., the regulations concerning marriage, divorce, affiliation,
and inheritance.  The law has always encouraged the contracting of formal marriages
registered by a notary (ma’dhûn), whose authority is officially acknowledged. However,
marriages satisfying minimal conditions, i.e., those established in a contractual form and
testiﬁed  by  two  witnesses  are  deemed  legitimate.  Nevertheless,  contrary  to  official
marriages registered by the notary, this type of marriage is not demurrable and cannot
be invoked by the wife in front of law courts. Until Law No. 1 of the year 2000, no claim
concerning marriage could be heard by the courts unless it was supported by an official
marriage document (Art.  99 §  4  of  Law No.  78 of  1931).  Law No.  1  of  the year 2000
introduces a very important change in that respect: any written document can be used to
prove the existence of the customary marriage whose dissolution is asked to the judge.
Article 17 al. 2 provides: 
Shall not be admissible in case of denial [of] the petitions arising from a marriage
contract  –  in  respect  of  the  facts  subsequent  to  August  1st,  1931  –  unless  its
conclusion  is  established  by  an  official  document.  This  notwithstanding,  the
petition in divorce or annulation shall be admissible, as the case may be, to the
exclusion of other lawsuits, if the marriage is established by any writing. 
57 This type of marriage, which does not fulfill the official registration requirement but is
still legitimate, is commonly called zawâg curfî, meaning literally “customary marriage.”
According to the theory of legal pluralism, the mere use of this word testiﬁes to the
existence of a multitude of legal  orders among which people navigate and engage in
forum shopping. However, it must be stressed that this “customary marriage” is explicitly
recognized by the law (even though restrictively) and regarded as legal by the people. In
no way does it constitute an alternative or parallel legal order. It is used in order to
preclude some of the consequences of officially registered marriages – for example, in the
case of polygamous marriage, keeping the subsequent marriage secret and not informing
the ﬁrst wife as required by Law No. 100 of 1985; when minors are getting married; to
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escape the high cost of marriage; as a way for widows to remarry without forfeiting their
widowhood pensions – but it is also explicitly practiced in order to extend a legal status to
sexual intercourse and to some of the practices associated with it  that are otherwise
blameworthy (e.g.,  cohabiting,  procreating  legitimate children,  etc.) In  this  case,  the
theories of legal pluralism, far from providing us with the means to properly describe the
situation, contribute to the prevailing confusion, through laying the groundwork for a
pluralistic situation to which people do not orient themselves 
 
Gay customary marriage as a law-centered practice 
58 In April 2000, the press heard about a case investigated by the Public Prosecutor, which
involved  two  men  who  had  contracted  a  customary  marriage.  The  investigation
transcripts show that it was the case of a computer store owner who had induced a young
man working in his store to have homosexual intercourse under threat of divulgating
marriage-like documents that had been signed by the latter. The young man eventually
complained at the police station and the police and then the Prosecutor investigated the
facts,  which  were  subsequently  characterized  as  indecent  assault  under  duress.  The
plaintiff’s narrative was as follows: 
Question of the Public Prosecutor: What is your information concerning the facts of
the investigation? Answer of the plaintiff: Since August 1988 A.D.19I went working at
the  Computer  Office  […]  because  I  went  often  to  the  Office  to  play  with  the
computer and I worked for a monthly stipend of 150 EGP and it must increase after
settling better in the work and after two or three months work he told me to take
some furniture in the store and come we go down Cairo to know you better and we
purchase stuff from there and we went to Cairo and after having bought stuff for
work he asked we stay in a place that pleases me and we stayed in the Shahrazâd
hotel and he took a beer and we drank and it was the ﬁrst time I drank beer and it
disturbed me and my head turned and I didn’t feel myself and every time I feel tired
he tells me you aren’t a man look how you drink and then we went down to go out
and we took the car and he opened the box and he took from it three or four sheets
and he told me this sheet you sign it you and me and I asked him why do I sign on
an empty sheet and he told me you you’ll get important responsibility in work and
whoever who has important responsibility in work signs a sheet like this one in
case  anything happens in  the store  I  signed on the sheet in  good faith  cause  I
respected him a lot and I wasn’t on my guard and we went out and after three or
four days he told me come eating with me at home and I went with him to the
house which is in Nizâm and there’re beer bottles and I told him I felt tired last time
and I don’t wanna drink and he began insisting and I drank a bottle and I said it’s
enough he can’t anymore cause I’m going to vomit and in the middle of the dinner
he put his hand on my leg and on my male organ and I I pushed him back and he
told me stay so we ﬁnish dining and after  we’ll  speak and after  dinner and he
resumed his attempt and I I (???) him and I was ready to go he told me the door’s in
front of you if you wanna go down go down but don’t forget the sheet you signed
and I asked him the sheet and I told him this is a sheet for work he told me it’s
blank and I I’ll write on it that you you’d money and your family had money and I’ll
add words of my own and I’ll destitute you and your family and I was compelled
under the sheet menace to listen to him and I ask him what do you want from me
and he tells me sit down and he went taking a video movie a sex movie and he put it
on and he told me come so we do like them and he took off his clothes and I took off
my clothes except the underwear and he began putting his hand on me and he told
me watch the movie and […] later he slept with me a second time and after that one
I put on my clothes and I went down and all what I was talking about it was in his
room in his father’s house […] and the day after I didn’t go to work he called me and
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I told him I don’t come working and you give me the sheet as soon as I quit the job
and after two or three days he spoke to me a second time on this issue and I began
telling him shame on you it’s unnecessary and he menaced me with the sheet and
he told me we aren’t going to Nizâm and we’re going to go to Kafr al-Zand and the
day after I went with him in the ﬂat which is in Kafr al-Zand and he told me come
you’re the ﬁrst one […] the process repeated every week three times […] and we
kept on until December 1998 and afterwards I tried to keep out of him and he sent
me people and I came back to work a second time in July approximately and he
asked me to have intercourse and I kept on refusing and at the last feast of the
sacriﬁce one week before the feast when I was working with him he menaced me
with the sheet and theft if I didn’t go at his home and I went home and I told [the
story] to my family and to Khilânî and they told me you must bring an action and
he sent me letters at home he asked me to come back to work and I kept the letters
until he sent me a copy of the contract of declaration and mutual engagement and
his name was crossed out and the number of the card and his signature and his
ﬁngerprint and on it also my name and the number of my card and my signature
and my ﬁngerprint and in addition a letter in which he was menacing me and all
this it was last week and the ﬁrst sheet the week before and I took the letters and I
went to the police station and I presented my complaint and the made me a record
and  the  brought  Mu’min  and  we’re  presented  to  the  Prosecution.  (Public
Prosecution, Zagazig, 2000) 
59 The  press,  the  parties,  the  Public  Prosecutor,  all  parties  refer  to  the  “contract  of
declaration and mutual engagement.” It is implicitly or explicitly argued that the two
men had contracted a kind of “customary marriage.” According to the theories of legal
pluralism, this would testify to the existence of a plurality of social ﬁelds (e.g., gay people,
the police, the state, the press, etc.), each one being endowed with and generating its own
normative values and rules, i.e., producing its own law and having a law mirroring its
social norms. However, this is particularly confusing, since it is obvious from the case
that there is no legal plurality but only legal practices, i.e., practices oriented toward an
object of reference identified by the people as law, be it for interpreting it, implementing
it, bypassing it, emptying it of its substance, contesting it, or whatever else. 
60 So-called “customary law” is  centered on the legally organized practices of  marriage
contracting. It is oriented toward the creation of mutual rights and obligations by the
signing of a written document. It follows the lines of “customary marriage”, despite the
malicious intent of one of the two parties. It does not reﬂect the existence of parallel
systems  of  law,  but  only  reveals  the  law-centered  organization  of  a  whole  range  of
(private) practices. It is not only the state legal system that “digests” the social so as to
give to the facts that are brought to its attention a characterization that makes them
legally relevant and open to the ascription of legal consequences, but it is also the many
so-called social ﬁelds that take state law as their focal point. 
 
Gay customary marriage condemnation as an instance of legal
plurality 
61 Also in 2000 it was reported by the press that two young men were found dead in the
countryside near the town of Aswân, in Upper Egypt. Their bodies showed that they had
been executed. In accordance with the law and their own professional procedures, the
police opened a ﬁle and transferred the case to the Public Prosecution, which had to
conduct the investigation. However, for lack of evidence on which to build the case, the
case  was  soon considered closed.  Parallel  to  the  official  story  of  the  case,  the  press
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reported that the boys in fact had a sexual relationship and had entered into a kind of
customary marriage. Because their families found the situation unacceptable, they asked
that a customary assembly (majlis al-carab, majlis curfî), be convened, which was required to
adjudicate the case. It is said that the assembly convened and issued a ruling condemning
the two boys to death. 
62 Short as it is, this little story explicitly reflects the existence of parallel systems of justice
that function autonomously, independent of each other, despite the possibility that their
respective paths may cross at a certain point. There is, on the one hand, the state justice
system,  represented  by  the  police  and  the  Public  Prosecution,  whose  functioning
necessitates the opening of a ﬁle and a procedure as soon as some criminal act comes to
their attention. Technically speaking, this system cannot enter into any negotiation with
an alternative justice system without jeopardizing its claim to the monopoly of legitimate
authority. Practically, it is often confronted by certain types of crimes that are known by
its  professionals  to  fall  outside  the  scope  of  its  jurisdiction.  Both  policemen  and
prosecutors are very much aware of the existence of so-called Arab councils and local
traditions, which issue rulings and cover what appears to state law as criminal liability
beyond a collectively enforced solidarity (which results mainly in the unavailability of
witnesses  testifying  to,  and  of  evidence  substantiating,  the  crime  and  its  individual
author). 
63 On the other hand, there is a “customary” legal system which is identiﬁed as such, and
oriented to, by the people and issues its own rulings20on a large number of matters. This
justice system, which runs parallel to the official system, may borrow many of its features
from the  latter  (form of  procedures,  explicit  references  to  substantial  provisions  of
positive law, written rulings, etc.) However, it clearly stands on its own feet and neither
depends nor is centered on the existence of state law. In other words, it constitutes an
example of a legal plural order. In this case, curf (custom) does constitute law, in so far as
social actors attribute such a quality to it. It can therefore be called customary law and
can become the object of customary legal practices. 
64 In sum, the three cases brieﬂy discussed appear to constitute instances of legal pluralism
(weak or strong in Griffiths’ terminology). However, if we closely examine the ﬁne detail
of these cases, and especially the ways in which people orient to the supposedly many
laws and norms, we get a much better picture of what law is and is not for these people.
We also get a much better understanding of its plural sources and the non-pluralistic
ways of its implementation, and of the many places where laws interfere with each other
and the very few places where they remain totally autonomous. Last but not least, norms,
laws and legal practices cease to be confounded. Any set of norms is not necessarily law,
and law is no more diluted in the all-encompassing and little-analyzed category of “social
control.” Many practices can be characterized as legal practices, and not as parallel social,
normative or legal  ﬁelds.  Legal  practices are those practices that  develop around an
object of reference identiﬁed by the people as law (and that can be state law or any other
law recognized as such). In other words, a legal practice is everything that is done in a
way in which it would not be done if the law of reference did not exist. 
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NOTES
1. On the Adat Law School, see K. von Benda-Beckmann and F. Strijbosch, 1986. Also, C. Geertz,
1983. 
2. C. Van Vollenhoven, Het Adatrecht van Nederlansche Indië, 3 vols, Leyde, 1918, 1931, 1933. 
3. Among these scholars, see M. Koesnoe, 1971. 
4. J. Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism”, Journal of Legal Pluralism, no. 24:1-55. 
5. Although other  contributions  are  certainly  as  important  as  Griffiths’;  see  for  instance  M.
Galanter, “Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law”, Journal of Legal
Pluralism and Unofficial Law, no. 19. As a whole, Griffiths’ approach to legal pluralism is mainly
represented  in  the  Commission  on  Folk-Law  and  Legal  Pluralism  and  in  the  Journal  of  Legal
Pluralism  and  Unofficial  Law,  in  which  the  inﬂuential  presence  of  Dutch  scholarship  must  be
stressed. Among other prominent representatives of this “school”, one might mention Gordon
Woodman, Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Fons Strijbosch. 
6. J. Griffiths, op.cit.:3. 
7. J. Griffiths, op.cit.:4. 
8. J. Griffiths, op.cit.:8. 
9. J. Griffiths, op.cit.:14. 
10. J. Griffiths, op.cit.:38. 
11. The semi-autonomous social ﬁeld “can generate rules and customs and symbols internally,
but […] is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger
world by which it is surrounded. The semi-autonomous social ﬁeld has rule-making capacities,
and the means to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social
matrix which can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it,
sometimes at its own instance”. S.F. Moore, 1973:720. 
12. E. Serverin, Sociologie du droit, Paris, La Découverte, 2000. The following paragraph is directly
borrowed from this book. 
13. Also, J. Comaroff and S. Roberts, 1981. Recently, Marie-Claire Foblets edited a special issue of
the Journal of Legal Pluralism on the theme of “popular justice” (no. 36, 1996). 
14. A. Guevara-Gil, J. Thome, “Notes on Legal Pluralism”, Beyond Law, vol. 2, no. 5, 1992:75-102, at
87. 
15. See infra, section 4. 
16. This is why I proposed to substitute the notion of “normative plurality.” B. Dupret, “Legal
Pluralism, Normative Plurality, and the Arab World”, op.cit. 
What is plural in the law ? A praxiological answer
Égypte/Monde arabe, 1 | 2005
21
17. For an excellent and concise summary, see K. Bälz, “Sharî ca and Qanun in Egyptian Law: A
Systems Theory Approach to Legal Pluralism”, Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, no. 2,
1995, 37-53, at 40-42. 
18. Lawrence  Rosen  describes  it  as  “a  set  of  orientations  which  gains  its  very  life  by
reverberating through numerous analytically separable domains so as to appear immanent in all
of them”, and as “commonsense assumptions about features that crosscut virtually all domains
of  law  and  life  –assumptions  about  human  nature,  particular  kinds  of  relationships,  the
“meaning”  of  given  acts.”  L.  Rosen,  “Legal  Pluralism  and  Cultural  Unity  in  Morocco”,  in  B.
Dupret, M. Berger, L. al-Zwaini (eds), op.cit.:90. 
19. In Arabic, “milâdî”, which means, “of the Christian era.” 
20. On  Arab  councils  and  customary  law  in  Upper  Egypt,  see  H.K.  Nielsen,  “Négociation  et
écriture: à propos du droit coutumier en Égypte”, Égypte/Monde arabe, no. 34:155-165 and S. Ben
Neﬁssa, “The Haqq al-”Arab: Conﬂict Resolution and Distinctive Features of Legal Pluralism in
Contemporary Egypt”, in B. Dupret, M. Berger, L. al-Zwaini (eds),  op.cit.  See also H. Korsholm
Nielsen in this volume. 
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